Weapons of Mass Destruction and Non-Proliferation MCQs 2026

50 questions with detailed answers · 35 from past papers · 5 quiz batches available

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Page 1 of 1 Questions 110 of 50
  1. Q1 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in

    1. A 1963
    2. B 1970
    3. C 1985
    4. D 1996
    💡 Explanation:

    The NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970.

  2. Q2 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    The NPT rests on three main pillars

    1. A trade liberalization, sanctions and deterrence only
    2. B verification, export controls and sanctions only
    3. C peaceful use, sanctions and first-strike only
    4. D non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy
    💡 Explanation:

    NPT pillars are preventing spread, pursuing disarmament, and facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation.

  3. Q3 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    The five recognized nuclear-weapon states under the NPT are

    1. A India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and Iran
    2. B United States, India, France, Israel and China
    3. C Russia, India, Pakistan, China and France
    4. D United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China
    💡 Explanation:

    Only the five permanent NWS at NPT negotiation are recognized as nuclear-weapon states under the treaty.

  4. Q4 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    India's status regarding the NPT is that it

    1. A is a founding signatory and NWS
    2. B signed in 1970 and ratified in 1974
    3. C withdrew after Pokhran-II tests
    4. D has not signed the treaty and considers it discriminatory
    💡 Explanation:

    India rejects the NPT as creating a permanent nuclear apartheid between haves and have-nots.

  5. Q5 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    Pakistan's position on the NPT is that it

    1. A ratified in 1970 as a non-nuclear state
    2. B joined as a nuclear-weapon state in 1998
    3. C has not joined and links accession to regional balance with India
    4. D signed and ratified the Additional Protocol only
    💡 Explanation:

    Pakistan refuses NPT membership absent a South Asian nuclear settlement reflecting parity.

  6. Q6 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    Horizontal nuclear proliferation refers to

    1. A increasing warhead stockpiles by existing nuclear powers
    2. B the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states
    3. C improving delivery systems within one state only
    4. D civilian nuclear power expansion only
    💡 Explanation:

    Horizontal proliferation means new actors acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

  7. Q7 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    Vertical nuclear proliferation refers to

    1. A first acquisition by a new state
    2. B banning all nuclear tests globally
    3. C qualitative or quantitative expansion of arsenals by existing nuclear powers
    4. D civilian reactor construction only
    💡 Explanation:

    Vertical proliferation involves existing NWS enhancing or enlarging their arsenals.

  8. Q8 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed in

    1. A 1963
    2. B 1945
    3. C 1970
    4. D 1996
    💡 Explanation:

    The PTBT (Limited Test Ban Treaty) was concluded in Moscow in 1963.

  9. Q9 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    The PTBT prohibits nuclear weapon tests

    1. A underground tests only
    2. B in the atmosphere, outer space and under water
    3. C all tests including underground
    4. D only atmospheric tests over oceans
    💡 Explanation:

    The 1963 treaty banned tests except those conducted underground.

  10. Q10 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted in

    1. A 1963
    2. B 1985
    3. C 1996
    4. D 2010
    💡 Explanation:

    The CTBT was opened for signature at the UN in September 1996.

  11. Q11 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    The CTBT has not entered into force primarily because

    1. A IAEA rejected it
    2. B NPT superseded it
    3. C OPCW administers it instead
    4. D required Annex 2 states have not all ratified
    💡 Explanation:

    Entry into force requires ratification by 44 named Annex 2 states; several key holdouts remain.

  12. Q12 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    The proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would

    1. A ban production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
    2. B abolish all existing warheads immediately
    3. C permit unlimited HEU enrichment for weapons
    4. D replace IAEA safeguards entirely
    💡 Explanation:

    FMCT aims to cap future production of weapon-grade fissile material.

  13. Q13 hard

    FMCT negotiations have been stalled mainly in the

    1. A IAEA Board of Governors
    2. B UN General Assembly Fifth Committee
    3. C NATO Nuclear Planning Group
    4. D Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
    💡 Explanation:

    The CD operates by consensus; FMCT has long been blocked there.

  14. Q14 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in

    1. A 1945
    2. B 1968
    3. C 1974
    4. D 1957
    💡 Explanation:

    The IAEA was created under a 1956 statute and began operations in 1957.

  15. Q15 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    The headquarters of the IAEA is in

    1. A Geneva, Switzerland
    2. B Vienna, Austria
    3. C The Hague, Netherlands
    4. D New York, USA
    💡 Explanation:

    The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna.

  16. Q16 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    IAEA safeguards are designed to

    1. A enforce NPT sanctions on non-members
    2. B operate NATO nuclear sharing
    3. C control missile exports globally
    4. D verify that nuclear material is not diverted to weapons
    💡 Explanation:

    Safeguards detect diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful uses.

  17. Q17 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed largely in response to

    1. A Pakistan's 1998 tests
    2. B India's 1974 nuclear test (Smiling Buddha)
    3. C North Korea's 2006 test
    4. D Soviet Union's first test
    💡 Explanation:

    The NSG was created in 1974 after India used civilian-imported technology for a weapon test.

  18. Q18 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    The NSG seeks to

    1. A ban all nuclear energy worldwide
    2. B verify CTBT compliance
    3. C control exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology
    4. D administer the Chemical Weapons Convention
    💡 Explanation:

    The NSG coordinates export controls to prevent proliferation through trade.

  19. Q19 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    India obtained a waiver from the NSG in 2008 to

    1. A engage in civil nuclear trade despite not being an NPT member
    2. B become a recognized nuclear-weapon state
    3. C conduct unlimited weapons tests
    4. D join NATO nuclear planning
    💡 Explanation:

    The 2008 waiver allowed civil nuclear cooperation with India under IAEA safeguards.

  20. Q20 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    India's declared nuclear doctrine emphasizes

    1. A first-strike preemption as standard policy
    2. B unlimited arsenal expansion
    3. C NATO-style extended deterrence for allies
    4. D No First Use (NFU) and credible minimum deterrence
    💡 Explanation:

    India's 2003 doctrine pledges NFU and minimum credible deterrence.

  21. Q21 hard

    Debate over India's NFU policy often concerns whether

    1. A India has never stated NFU publicly
    2. B circumstances such as chemical/biological attack or arsenal loss could lead to revision
    3. C Pakistan also maintains NFU
    4. D NFU is mandated by the NPT
    💡 Explanation:

    Strategic debates question NFU under extreme contingencies though official doctrine retains NFU.

  22. Q22 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence doctrine aims to

    1. A match India's NFU pledge
    2. B deter threats at tactical, operational and strategic levels
    3. C eliminate all nuclear weapons in South Asia
    4. D rely solely on conventional forces
    💡 Explanation:

    FSD covers battlefield to strategic rungs including short-range systems like Nasr.

  23. Q23 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    Pakistan rejects a No First Use policy primarily because

    1. A NPT requires first use
    2. B IAEA mandates preemption
    3. C it fears conventional inferiority could invite Indian aggression
    4. D China pressures Pakistan to reject NFU
    💡 Explanation:

    Pakistan views nuclear weapons as offsetting conventional asymmetry against India.

  24. Q24 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is administered by

    1. A IAEA
    2. B CTBTO
    3. C the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
    4. D NSG
    💡 Explanation:

    The OPCW in The Hague implements the CWC.

  25. Q25 medium

    The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force in

    1. A 1975
    2. B 1963
    3. C 1993
    4. D 2001
    💡 Explanation:

    The BWC opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.

  26. Q26 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force in

    1. A 1996
    2. B 2021
    3. C 2005
    4. D 2015
    💡 Explanation:

    The TPNW reached the required 50 ratifications and entered into force on 22 January 2021.

  27. Q27 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    Nuclear-weapon states under the NPT are obligated under Article VI to

    1. A pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament
    2. B transfer weapons to allies freely
    3. C expand arsenals for deterrence
    4. D withdraw from IAEA safeguards
    💡 Explanation:

    Article VI commits NWS to work toward cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament.

  28. Q28 medium

    NPT Article IV addresses

    1. A mandatory disarmament timelines
    2. B the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy
    3. C ban on all enrichment
    4. D IAEA punitive strikes
    💡 Explanation:

    Article IV affirms peaceful uses and international cooperation for non-nuclear weapon states.

  29. Q29 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    The Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards provides for

    1. A abolition of all safeguards
    2. B broader inspections including undeclared sites
    3. C weapons-only verification
    4. D CTBT monitoring only
    💡 Explanation:

    The Additional Protocol expands the IAEA's access beyond declared facilities.

  30. Q30 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in

    1. A 1994
    2. B 2006
    3. C 2010
    4. D 2003
    💡 Explanation:

    Pyongyang declared withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003.

  31. Q31 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    Israel's nuclear policy is commonly described as

    1. A full NPT membership as NWS
    2. B public NFU treaty ratification
    3. C nuclear ambiguity (amimut) without confirming or denying arsenal
    4. D complete nuclear disarmament by 1990
    💡 Explanation:

    Israel neither confirms nor denies possession, maintaining deliberate opacity.

  32. Q32 medium

    The MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) primarily controls

    1. A fissile material production
    2. B biological agents only
    3. C exports of missiles and related delivery technology
    4. D cyber weapons exclusively
    💡 Explanation:

    MTCR partners restrict transfers of missiles and unmanned delivery systems capable of WMD.

  33. Q33 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) during the Cold War assumed

    1. A both superpowers could survive a first strike and retaliate devastatingly
    2. B one side could win a nuclear war cleanly
    3. C nuclear weapons would never be used
    4. D conventional forces were irrelevant
    💡 Explanation:

    MAD rested on secure second-strike capability deterring first use.

  34. Q34 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    The INF Treaty (1987) between the US and USSR banned

    1. A all submarine-launched missiles
    2. B all nuclear testing worldwide
    3. C ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear missiles
    4. D short-range artillery only
    💡 Explanation:

    The INF eliminated an entire class of US and Soviet ground-launched missiles.

  35. Q35 hard

    The US withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 citing

    1. A IAEA non-compliance
    2. B Russian violations and emerging Chinese missile capabilities
    3. C NPT expiration
    4. D OPCW budget disputes
    💡 Explanation:

    Washington accused Moscow of breaching the treaty and cited strategic competition with China.

  36. Q36 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    India conducted its Pokhran-II nuclear tests in

    1. A May 1998
    2. B 1974 only
    3. C 1990
    4. D 2006
    💡 Explanation:

    India's five tests on 11–13 May 1998 declared it a nuclear-weapon state.

  37. Q37 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    Pakistan responded to Pokhran-II with its Chagai tests in

    1. A 1974
    2. B May 1998
    3. C 1990
    4. D 2001
    💡 Explanation:

    Pakistan conducted six tests at Chagai on 28 May 1998.

  38. Q38 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    Extended nuclear deterrence refers to

    1. A states extending test moratoria only
    2. B a nuclear state pledging to protect non-nuclear allies with its arsenal
    3. C horizontal proliferation to allies
    4. D IAEA technical assistance
    💡 Explanation:

    NATO's nuclear umbrella is a classic case of extended deterrence.

  39. Q39 hard

    The CTBTO Preparatory Commission monitors compliance using

    1. A IAEA safeguards alone
    2. B NSG export reports only
    3. C a global International Monitoring System (IMS)
    4. D NATO AWACS aircraft
    💡 Explanation:

    The IMS uses seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide stations worldwide.

  40. Q40 medium

    A nuclear hotline between India and Pakistan was established to

    1. A implement NPT safeguards
    2. B coordinate CTBT ratification
    3. C reduce risk of miscalculation during crises
    4. D share enrichment technology
    💡 Explanation:

    Crisis communication channels help manage escalation in South Asia.

  41. Q41 medium

    Nuclear security summits (2010–2016) focused on

    1. A securing fissile material and preventing nuclear terrorism
    2. B abolishing NATO nuclear sharing
    3. C expanding weapons testing
    4. D replacing NPT with TPNW
    💡 Explanation:

    Summits promoted securing vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.

  42. Q42 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS easy

    Fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons typically includes

    1. A depleted uranium only
    2. B natural uranium without enrichment
    3. C heavy water alone
    4. D highly enriched uranium and weapon-grade plutonium
    💡 Explanation:

    HEU and Pu-239 are the main fissile materials for weapons.

  43. Q43 hard

    The Australia Group coordinates export controls on

    1. A chemical and biological weapons-related materials
    2. B nuclear reactors only
    3. C conventional small arms only
    4. D cyber tools exclusively
    💡 Explanation:

    The Australia Group complements the CWC and BWC through export controls.

  44. Q44 hard

    The Wassenaar Arrangement controls exports of

    1. A conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies
    2. B nuclear warheads only
    3. C agricultural commodities
    4. D international migration flows
    💡 Explanation:

    Wassenaar promotes transparency in transfers of arms and sensitive dual-use items.

  45. Q45 hard

    South Asia's nuclear rivalry is often analyzed through the lens of

    1. A stability–instability paradox and crisis escalation
    2. B purely economic competition
    3. C Maritime law disputes only
    4. D UN peacekeeping mandates
    💡 Explanation:

    Scholars debate whether nuclear weapons stabilize conflict at strategic level but encourage lower-level probes.

  46. Q46 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS medium

    A minimum credible deterrence posture seeks

    1. A numerical parity with every global power
    2. B unlimited warhead production
    3. C a survivable arsenal sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage
    4. D first-strike dominance
    💡 Explanation:

    Minimum deterrence avoids arms racing while maintaining retaliatory credibility.

  47. Q47 Past Paper · PPSC/FPSC/CSS hard

    The 1968 NPT distinguishes nuclear-weapon states as those that

    1. A manufactured and exploded a device before 1 January 1967
    2. B joined NATO before 1950
    3. C possess ICBMs only
    4. D ratified CTBT before 1996
    💡 Explanation:

    The cutoff date defines the five NWS; later possessors remain outside NPT recognition.

  48. Q48 hard

    UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009) addressed

    1. A nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament broadly
    2. B Iran sanctions only
    3. C Libya civil war only
    4. D cyber warfare exclusively
    💡 Explanation:

    Resolution 1887 reaffirmed non-proliferation goals during a Security Council summit.

  49. Q49 medium

    Dual-use technology in non-proliferation refers to items that

    1. A are used only for weapons
    2. B cannot be exported legally
    3. C are exempt from IAEA safeguards
    4. D can serve both civilian and military nuclear purposes
    💡 Explanation:

    Enrichment and reprocessing equipment exemplify dual-use proliferation concerns.

  50. Q50 hard

    The concept of nuclear taboo suggests that

    1. A testing is encouraged under NPT
    2. B proliferation is legally unlimited
    3. C deterrence never works
    4. D using nuclear weapons has become largely unthinkable due to normative stigma
    💡 Explanation:

    Schelling and others argue a strong norm inhibits nuclear use despite capabilities.